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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
by
Vincent W. Perini*
T HE drama of the death penalty dominated criminal jurisprudence in
1976. The high stakes alone make the subject breathtaking for those who
touch it, but there was much more than that to make the capital punishment
debate interesting to Texas lawyers. The United States Supreme Court
surprised no one by its decision that capital punishment is not unconstitution-
al per se, but the Court's approval of the Texas death penalty procedure
raised a cloud of questions likely to remain unsettled for a long time. In the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals the polemics were characterized by shifts
of opinion, dissents filed and withdrawn, and a commitment of energy and
thoroughness, especially concerning jury selection in capital cases, not
always characteristic of our supreme court for criminal matters.
I. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The United States Supreme Court ended the long period of doubt over the
constitutionality of capital punishment with its decision in Gregg v. Georgia. I
In addition, it upheld the Texas death penalty procedure enacted in 1973 by
affirming Jurek v. Texas. 2 The Supreme Court discussed the Texas procedure
in capital cases 3 in light of the Georgia and Florida statutes which were
simultaneously upheld,4 while at the same time it struck down the Louisiana
and North Carolina statutes for failure to permit sufficient consideration of
mitigating circumstances.5 In focusing on the three death penalty "special
issues" employed in the Texas system after a finding of guilt, 6 the Supreme
Court explained that the constitutionality of the Texas procedure turned on
whether the enumerated questions would allow consideration of specific
mitigating factors. One of those special issue questions had been the center of
debate by the court of criminal appeals when it decided Jurek v. State.7
The controversy in Jurek was created by the majority's approval of Special
Issue No. 2 which asks the jury to answer "yes" or "no" to whether a
* B.A., Yale University; LL.B., University of Texas. Lecturer, Southern Methodist
University School of Law; Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author acknowledges with
thanks the assistance of Mary Sue Black, Esq., Michael Anthony, Esq., John Brunetti, Esq., and
Arch McColl, Esq.
1. 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).
2. 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976).
3. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071
(Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
4. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, % S. Ct.
2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929(1976).
5. Robert v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001,49 L. Ed. 2d 974 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976).
6. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
7. 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App.), aff'd, % S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976).
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probability exists that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.8 Concurring in part and
dissenting in part,9 Judge Odom quoted authorities on statistics in reaching his
conclusion that the question was too vague. 10 Judge Roberts, dissenting, went
even further in his analysis of the word "probability," and concluded that
probability as measured and defined in mathematical or statistical terms
meant a "chance-however large or small,"" and therefore he was also of the
opinion that Special Issue No. 2 was vague and overbroad. He reasoned that
the issue could never be answered in favor of the defendant because the
question by its terms would be answered in the affirmative for all individuals,
no matter how "saintly." He would have severed Special Issue No. 2 from
the statute, but he found the remainder constitutionally acceptable.
In its plurality opinion in Jurek delivered by Justice Stevens, the Supreme
Court pointed to examples where judges, other sentencing authorities, and
parole authorities must often predict a person's future conduct and con-
cluded: "The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory
question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed
countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal jus-
tice."1 2 The Court applauded the Texas procedure for permitting the defend-
ant to call to the jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstances he might
be able to show. 13 Indeed, when Texas Attorney General John Hill argued the
case before the Supreme Court he pointed out that anything may be in-
troduced by either side at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial in
Texas, subject to constitutional limitations.' 4 The Court stressed the impor-
tance of putting before the jury all possible relevant information about the
individual defendant whose fate it must determine. In the cases decided that
same day the Supreme Court indicated a clear preference for the bifurcated
trial procedure used in Texas.' 5
Complicity. In Smith v. State, 6 the only other Texas capital murder case
affirmed before the Supreme Court's opinion in Jurek, the court of criminal
appeals held that a defendant can receive the death sentence under Texas law
even though he himself did not commit the murder. 1 The language of Special
Issue No. 1 raises the possibility of an opposite result, however, because it
speaks of "the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
". 1, According to the undisputed evidence in Smith, the defendant's
8. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
9. Judge Odom agreed with the majority that the death penalty is not unconstitutional, but
he disagreed with the court's interpretaton of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1976-77). 522 S.W.2d at 943.
10. See, e.g., R. YOUNG & D. VELDMAN, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES (1972).
11. 522 S.W.2d at 948.
12. 96 S. Ct. at 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 940-41.
13. Id. at 2956-57, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 939.
14. 19 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4007 (1976).
15. See the opinions in Gregg, Proffitt, Roberts, and Woodson, notes 4-5 supra and
accompanying text.
16. 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
17. Id. at 696.
18. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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accomplice had shot and killed the victim. There was evidence, however, that
the defendant would have shot the night clerk had his pistol been working, and
that he had actively encouraged his accomplice to shoot by shouting, "Get
him, Howie!'' 19
Following Jurek and Smith, any remaining questions about complicity in
the Texas death penalty statute were foreclosed in Livingston v. State20 which
was decided in October after the Supreme Court had affirmed Jurek. Liv-
ingston was outside the store when his accomplice murdered three atten-
dants, and there was no evidence that he sought their deaths or even knew
what was happening inside. Even though Smith was decided under the former
law of principals2 and Livingston's case came under the new Penal Code, 22
the majority did not construe sections 7.01 and 7.02 to require a different
result.
Sufficiency of Evidence-Special Issue Number Two. The complicity issue
was raised in Livingston on the ground of insufficient evidence, and dissent-
ing Judge Roberts said the same argument was applicable to Special Issue No.
2.23 He reasoned that since the evidence in the guilt phase of the trial failed to
show any participation by this defendant in the murders, the evidence was
insufficient to support an affirmative answer that he would commit crimes of
violence in the future, whether he was legally guilty of the crime in question or
not. The only other evidence to support this finding was the testimony of two
psychiatrists, which, Judge Roberts argued, should have been held inadmis-
sible because the testimony was so ethereal and speculative that it fell within
the court's holding in Hopkins v. State24 that "the benefit to be gained from
such testimony is not great enough to offset the disadvantages. "I
The court of criminal appeals dealt squarely with the issue of psychiatric
testimony at the punishment stage in Moore v. State26 which was decided the
same day as Livingston. In holding the psychiatric evidence admissible, 27 the
majority quoted article 37.071, which governs the punishment proceedings,
that "evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to sentence." Concerning the issue of sufficiency of evidence to
19. 540 S.W.2d at 696 n.3.
20. 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
21. Under the "law of principals," "[wihere several people are acting together in pursuit of
an unlawful act, each one is liable for collateral crimes, even though unplanned and unintended,
committed by other principals if those crimes are the foreseeable, ordinary and probable
consequences of the preparation or execution of the unlawful act." Thompson v. State, 514
S.W.2d 275, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
22. The Texas Penal Code went into effect Jan. 1, 1974, and the offense for which Livingston
was convicted occurred on May I1, 1974, so his case was governed by the provisions of TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01-.02 (Vernon 1974).
23. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
24. 480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
25. Id. at 220. Hopkins held inadmissible psychiatric testimony favorable to the defendant in
the punishment part of a trial. In the Smith case, however, psychiatric testimony predicting
dangerousness was admitted. In its opinion in Jurek the United States Supreme Court mentioned
the psychiatric testimony in Smith without comment, but implicitly with approval. % S. Ct. at
2957, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 939.
26. 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
27. Id. at 676.
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support an affirmative answer to Special Issue No. 2, the court held that the
testimony of two psychiatrists, coupled with the evidence of the offense itself
which was admitted at the guilt stage of the trial, was sufficient. The court did
not discuss the sufficiency point in Livingston, but held by implication that
considerably less evidence than that produced in Moore will suffice. 28 In
Livingston the defendant had not participated in the killing, and only two
psychiatrists testified. Objection was made in Livingston to the psychiatric
testimony on the grounds that it violated the defendant's fifth and sixth
amendment rights because the psychiatric opinion of one of the psychiatrists
was based on what the defendant had revealed during interviews outside the
presence of counsel. The court rejected this argument because the trial court
had scrupulously prevented any testimony by the psychiatrist concerning his
conversations with the defendant, citing United States v. Williams,29 and
reaffirming other cases such as United States v. Smith. 30
Smith v. State31 also gave the court an opportunity to consider the sufficien-
cy of such psychiatric testimony. Although the opinion does not explain if any
objections were made to such testimony, when discussing Special Issue No. 2
the court recited the evidence at the punishment stage of the trial, which
consisted of the testimony of a single psychiatrist for the state. He testified
that the defendant was suffering from an incurable personality disorder
characterized by a lack of remorse which stemmed from his participation in
the offense on trial as well as his probation for possession of marijuana and
his resulting difficulty in obtaining employment. Since the expert testimony
emphasized that defendant's entire conduct as a participant in the crime had
been calculated and was without remorse, the majority held that the jury was
justified in finding the defendant to be a continuing threat to society.
What was remarkable about this aspect of the Smith case was not the
majority opinion but the dissents, which were withdrawn in the interim
pending appellant's motion for rehearing and during which time the United
States Supreme Court ruled on the death penalty. Judge Roberts reiterated his
earlier dissent in Jurek while Judge Odom's dissent thoroughly probed, to a
much greater extent than the majority opinion, the sufficiency of evidence to
support an affirmative finding to Special Issue No. 2,32 as well as the court's
ruling concerning the applicability of the law of principals. 33 In regard to the
psychiatric testimony, Judge Odom excoriated the majority in his original
dissent for not questioning such evidence which he deemed inadmissible
28. 542 S.W.2d 655, 658-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
29. 456 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1972).
30. 436 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1971). Smith held that the advantages of unencumbered psychiat-
ric examination outweigh the dangers of self-incrimination.
31. 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). See note 16 supra and accompanying text for
discussion of the complicity aspects of Smith.
32. No. 49,809 (Tex. Crim. App., July 14, 1976). See the court records for the original
opinions in Smith. Judge Odom argued that the prior conviction and probation for possession of
marijuana were without probative value on Special Issue No. 2 and that he believed the
circumstances of the instant offense, standing alone, were insufficient as a matter of law to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender would probably commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
33. See the original opinions filed with the court. No. 49,809 (Tex. Crim. App., July 14,
1976).
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under any theory of law and "prejudicial beyond belief." 34 He cited Romero
v. State35 and Frye v. United States,36 which concerned the admission of
polygraph examinations, and reminded the majority that the test in those
cases had been applied to evidence derived from other scientific theories and
devices and that there was no reason not to apply it to scientific theories in the
field of psychiatry as well. Citing Hopkins v. State,37 he concluded:
While it is true that the profession of psychiatry has much to contribute to
that of law, and on certain issues the evidence of the psychiatrist can be
of great assistance to the trial of a case, in view of numerous speculations
made on the single determination that appellant lacked a sense of
remorse for the commission of the offense for which he was on trial, in
view of the issue upon which those speculations were presented, and in
view of the weight which those speculations by an expert undoubtedly
carried, I am unable to find that much of the testimony offered was from
this side of the twilight zone. The introduction of such highly prejudicial
psychiatric speculations deprived appellant of a fair trial at the punish-
ment stage. 38
Voir Dire. Three cases are noteworthy. First, Boulware v. State,39 which
overruled Hovila v. State,4° held that constitutional error in excusing scrupled
jurors under the doctrine of Witherspoon v. Illinois4 could be waived.
Second, Moore v. State42 held that even if the excusal of a scrupled juror
would have been error under an unqualified application of the Witherspoon
doctrine, it is not unconstitutional if the juror is excused pursuant to question-
ing in accordance with section 12.31(b) of the Texas Penal Code. 43 That
section requires a juror to state under oath that the "mandatory penalty of
death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on the issue of
fact," and was designed to eliminate the opportunity for jurors to exercise
discretion in the imposition of the dealth penalty, which the legislature
thought was required by Furman v. Georgia.44 By making the dealth penalty
questions issues of fact and by requiring jurors to swear that the result would
not affect those answers, it was thought that Furman's standards would be
satisfied. Compared with the Witherspoon test, the section 12.3 1(b) standard
is more favorable to the prosecution. The Witherspoon test would preclude
dismissal of a juror for cause unless the juror unqualifiedly stated that he
would automatically vote against the dealth penalty regardless of the facts
before him. The new Texas test enunciated in Moore questions whether the
juror's performance would be affected, not whether he would automatically
vote "no" on one or all of the death penalty questions regardless of the facts.
34. Id. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Jurek Judge Odom withdrew his original
dissent. 540 S.W.2d at 700.
35. 493 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
36. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
37. 480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
38. Id. at 221.
39. 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
40. 532 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
41. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
42. 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
43. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
44. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Nowhere is the turmoil surrounding capital punishment procedure better
illustrated than in the case of White v. State.4 5 It is the third in the trilogy of
1976 death penalty voir dire cases, along with Moore and Boulware, that
rewrite the law in Texas. All three of these cases indicate careful analysis and
a conscious effort by the court of criminal appeals to follow federal prece-
dent, at least by analogy.' In White the court held that a juror who has doubts
about his ability to "take an active part in the consideration and assessment of
the death penalty in a given case could be excused because the answer showed
he could not be an impartial juror in a case in which the range of punishment
included death." 47 Presiding Judge Onion filed a vigorous and thorough
dissent when the opinion was first delivered July 14, 1976. By the time the
motion for rehearing was overruled on October 6, 1976, however, Judge
Onion had withdrawn that dissent and had proposed in the majority opinion of
Moore v. State48 that the section 12.31 (b) standard become the court's escape
from the Witherspoon dilemma. Commissioner Dally's opinion in White,
which the court adopted, made no effort to enunciate a new approach.
Instead, and entirely within the framework of Witherspoon, the court con-
cluded that the doctrine had evolved to the point where it was no longer
viable. Citing its own holding in Tezeno v. State,49 the court stated as follows:
"We cannot believe that Witherspoon v. Illinois. . . requires certain formal
answers and none other. We surely feel that the test of Witherspoon is 'not to
be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century
pleading book, but with realism and rationality.' "50 The court then concluded
that after a "careful search and consideration of the record we find that
neither of the cited venireman. . . was excused in violation of the standards
of Witherspoon."''5
Another subject of interest in death penalty voir dire is the disqualification
of jurors on the ground that they cannot consider the minimum possible
punishment. Prior to 1965 the defense could challenge veniremen on the
ground that they could not consider the death penalty, but changes in the 1965
Code of Criminal Procedure apparently were aimed at eliminating such abuse.
Cases decided subsequent to the 1965 revision, but prior to the new death
penalty procedure, have held that the amended voir dire procedure precludes
the defense from challenging for cause on the ground of scruples against the
maximum punishment, but that it does not stop the state from challenging
unfavorable jurors on the ground that they are unable to consider the
minimum punishment possible in the case. 52 In Moore v. State53 the court
45. 543 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
46. The history of these three opinions prior to publication reflects considerable debate
among members of the Texas high court. This Article has already noted Judge Roberts' and Judge
Odom's withdrawal of their dissenting opinions in Smith following the Supreme Court's
affirmance of Jurek. See notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text.
47. 543 S.W.2d at 108.
48. 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
49. 484 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
50. 543 S.W.2d at 108.
51. Id. at 109.
52. See Morrison, Interpretative Commentary, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.17
(1966).
53. 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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indicated the state may excuse such jurors even when they are unable to
consider the minimum punishment for what amounts to a lesser includible
offense.
II. CONFESSIONS
Fifth Amendment. The fifth amendment rights of persons accused of white
collar crimes have been narrowed. In two taxpayer cases the United States
Supreme Court held that an accountant's work papers which had been
transferred by the taxpayer to his attorney could be subpoenaed from the
attorney and used against the taxpayer,54 and that incriminating information
which a gambler put on his tax return could be used against him.5 5 In the first
case, Fisher v. United States ,56 the Court explained that the case did not
present the issue of whether a taxpayer has a right to refrain from producing
his own tax records because the papers subpoenaed were not Fisher's private
papers and did not contain his own testimonial declarations. In the second
case, Garner v. United States,57 the Court did not qualify its prior opinion in
United States v. Sullivan58 which held that the right of a taxpayer to claim the
fifth amendment privilege exists, but only if claimed at the time the tax return
is filed. And in Andresen v. Maryland59 it was held that personal papers and
records, which might not have been subject to compulsory production by
subpoena because of possible violation of the fifth amendment, were
nevertheless subject to seizure pursuant to a valid warrant without violating
the fourth amendment.
In a recent federal criminal case the United States Supreme Court held that
the fact of defendant's silence at the time of arrest and his decision to invoke
his fifth amendment right to remain silent could not be used at his trial to
impeach him on cross-examination. 6° When confronted with a similar issue
raised in a state court proceeding, the Court enforced the same rule through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6' The case, Doyle v.
Ohio,62 is a classic study of the fundamental views concerning the fifth
amendment right to remain silent. Is it to be generously bestowed, a windfall
even to those who may be guilty of serious crimes, or should it be limited to its
essence? In Doyle the defendants came forward at trial with an explanation of
events which would make it difficult for anyone to understand why they did
not immediately explain their situation to arresting police. A dissent filed by
54. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1976), noted in 30 Sw. L.J. 788
(1976).
55. Garner v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1976).
56. 96 S. Ct. 1569, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1976).
57. 96 S. Ct. 1178, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1976).
58. 274 U.S. 259 (1972).
59. 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). For further discussion of Andresen see notes
168-70 infra and accompanying text.
60. United States v. Hale, 421 U.S. 171 (1974).
61. Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). For further discussion of Doyle see




three justices 63 would have allowed the prosecuting attorney on cross-
examination to ask the defendants why they chose to remain silent at time of
arrest. 64
Admissibility of Confessions. One of a prisoner's Miranda65 rights is the
prerogative to terminate interrogation. After his doing so, is the subsequent
prisoner's confession admissible if the interrogators come back two hours
later and prove successful in their second attempt? While warning police
against "persisting in repeated efforts to wear down [a prisoner's] resistence
and make him change his mind," the Supreme Court approved the police
actions before it in Michigan v. Moseley66 because the second round of
interrogation concerned another crime unrelated to the first, two hours had
elapsed, and fresh warnings were given prior to the second round. In a case
consistent with Moseley but illustrating its limits, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed a conviction where the subject was persuaded "bit by bit to
change his mind" after initially invoking his right not to talk with the
investigator.67
In McGilvery v. State68 the court interpreted the requisites of the Texas
confession statute 69 and reaffirmed an earlier holding that incriminating
remarks made to a cellmate must be corroborated as required by subsection
(e)7" just as if the remarks were an oral confession made to an officer.71
Moreover, McGilvery provides a lesson on the meaning and application of the
corroboration requirement. The opinion by Judge Odom distinguishes be-
tween statements to a cellmate about items belonging to the crime victim,
which had already been found by the police, and a statement about "another
dude" which led the police to conduct new laboratory tests which revealed
that a second man had been involved in the robbery-rape-murder. The latter
statement, according to Judge Odom, was new information previously un-
known to the police and was incriminating when the law of principals was
considered.72
The doctrine of Bruton v. United States73 precludes admitting into evidence
in a joint trial a confession by a co-defendent which implicates another
co-defendant as a denial of the sixth amendment right to cross-examine. If the
63. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.
64. Doyle was cited and followed in a recent Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Luna, 539
F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. 96 S. Ct. 321, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1976).
67. Hearne v. State, 534 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
68. 533 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
69. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
70. Id. art. 38.22(I)(e) provides:
The oral or written confession of a defendant made while the defendant was in jail
or other place of confinement or in the custody of an officer shall be admissible if:
It be made orally and the defendant makes a statement of facts or circumstances
that are found to be true, which conduce to establish his guilt, such as
the finding of secreted or stolen property, or the instrument with which he
states the offense was committed.
71. Easley v. State, 493 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
72. 533 S.W.2d at 26.
73. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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co-defendant takes the stand, however, no constitutional right to confront
and cross-examine is lost to the other co-defendant.74 In Thomas v. State75 a
co-defendant's confession was used for impeachment when the co-defendant
took the stand and testified in a manner inconsistent with the confession. On
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked him about the inconsistencies be-
tween his testimony and his confession, but did not introduce the confession
into evidence, and there was a limiting charge that the language was to be
considered only for impeachment purposes. In addition, none of the ques-
tions that were asked on cross-examination implicated the other co-defendant
and therefore the court held that the Bruton doctrine was inapplicable. 76
"Custody," "Focus, "and "Volunteered Statements." Both the Miranda
case and the Texas confessions statute use the word "custody," but cases
indicate that the word is not to be taken literally. Nevertheless, the trend is in
that direction, which means that the question of when the obligation to give
warnings and when the confessions statute begins its application will be left to
the investigating police, who may be inclined to prolong investigation and
delay arrest, as the following cases seem to indicate.
The current members of the United States Supreme Court, including two of
the dissenters in the Court's five-to-four Miranda decision, 77 seem to favor
narrowing the time when the Miranda rule is applicable. Conversely, the
Court is enlarging the prerogatives of police to question persons suspected of
crime without first cautioning them that what may appear to be routine
paperwork is a subtle process of focused interrogation calculated to elicit an
incautious incriminating remark. For example, Beckwith v. United States,78
another taxpayer case,79 held that no Miranda warnings were required even
though the focus of the Internal Revenue Service investigation may have been
on the taxpayer at the time he was interviewed. The opinion of Chief Justice
Burger for a six-Justice majority emphasized the lack of literal custody; the
agents came to the suspect's house, and later he went to their office. It is
important to note that the taxpayer did not go entirely without warnings from
his interrrogators, but the warnings they gave were not complete Miranda
warnings.80 Nevertheless, this holding is a precursor for what may prove to be
74. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1972).
75. 533 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
76. Id. at 798. For other Bruton doctrine sixth amendment cases see notes 128-33 infra and
accompanying text.
77. Justices Stewart and White.
78. 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976).
79. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
80. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court set forth the premise that
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities
in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, he must be warned prior to any questioning
that:
(1) he has the right to remain silent;
(2) anything he says can be used against him in a court of law;
(3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and
(4) if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
1977]
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an even more portentous decision, the Supreme Court's review of an Oregon
case which perhaps may eliminate "focus" from the Miranda lexicon."1
In light of this United States Supreme Court trend, is the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals applying a moribund standard? Creeks v. State82 marked the
line in the hazy area between investigation and custody beyond which the
Texas court would not permit withholding the application of Miranda re-
quirements and those of article 38.22.83 Reversing an order revoking the
defendant's probation, the court held inadmissible Creeks' admission to a
police polygraph examiner that he was guilty of the suspected theft. At the
time he was requested to consent to a lie detector test Creeks was not under
arrest nor had he been give the Miranda warning. Summarizing the testimony
the court stated as follows:
[T]he investigation of the theft had focused upon the Appellant at the
time he was brought to the polygraph office. . . and that he was taken in
custody from the polygraph office to the jail, where he was booked for
theft. One of the more significant factors to determine whether or not the
accused was in custody was whether or not the focus of the investigation
had centered upon the accused at the time he was interrogated.
In the same case an oral confession made to Creeks' probation officer was
held inadmissible under article 38.22, notwithstanding the argument that the
probationer was not under arrest or in custody at the time. The court noted
that (1) the probation officer had already filed a motion to revoke on the basis
of the crime in question, (2) he had caused a warrant to issue for the arrest of
the probationer, and (3) he had notified the police to come to the probation
office to make the arrest.8 5 Under these circustances the court held there was
sufficient custody for the application of article 38.22, even though it was not
literal custody.
The author of the Creeks opinion, Commissioner Brown, also wrote the
majority opinion in Bailey v. State,86 which preceded Creeks by about nine
months. In Bailey a woman had been found in her home bludgeoned to death,
and several persons, including the defendant, were nearby when she was
discovered. The opinion carefully sets out the testimony of the various
officers at the scene to whom the defendant made exculpatory remarks. This
is important because the degree of police suspicion was at issue. 87 The
defendant, who was apparently related to the deceased, was permitted to
leave. During the investigation at the scene the officers found a metal pipe
covered with blood and flesh and a coat with a pair of blood-stained gloves in
81. Oregon v. Mathiason, 275 Ore. 1, 549 P.2d 673, rev'dper curiam, No. 76-201 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1977); see 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4137 (1977).
82. 542 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). For further discussion of Creeks see notes
136-37 infra accompanying text.
83. Id. at 851, citing United States v. Phelps, 443 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1971).
84. Id.
85. Id. On rehearing, Presiding Judge Onion added an opinion reversing his prior stance. Id.
at 851. Judge Douglas wrote a forceful dissent, in which he reminded the majority that the
gravamen of Miranda was the accused's awareness of the coercive aspects of being held prisoner
and interrogated, which he believed were not at work when Creeks confessed to his probation
officer. Id. at 854-55.
86. 532 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
87. Id. at 319.
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one pocket. 88 The captain in charge left the scene but then received a radio call
that the defendant had returned and wished to talk to him. At the house he
found the defendant seated at a table with another officer and said, "I
understand that you wanted to talk with me." Defendant replied, "Yes, I did
not tell you the whole or the exact truth about everything." "Like what?" the
captain asked. The defendant replied, "I hid the murder weapon, a jacket,
and the gloves." 89 In holding that the admission of the confession was proper,
although no Miranda warnings had been given, the court stated as follows:
[T]he fact that the accused and police officers are together will not render
a statement inadmissible if the circumstances do not fall within the
definition of custodial interrogation. The fact that Appellant had been
free to go and had chosen to return in order to speak with Captain Edge
removed this case from the proscription of Miranda .'
The opinion quotes language in Miranda that defines custodial interrogation
not only in terms of the fact of custody or arrest, but also as to whether the
questioning was initiated by the police. The key factor in the eyes of the court,
however, was the defendant's initiative. "We find the Appellant's statement
was voluntarily given to Captain Edge and was, therefore, admissible. "91 The
court easily distinguished Ancira v. State,92 where an armed, uniformed
policeman in a police vehicle went to defendant's house and asked to talk to
him and then drove him around in the car until he confessed to possession of
heroin. The court cited Brown v. State93 as on point, but incorrectly stated
that in Brown the defendant had initiated the conversation which led to the
statement; 94 in fact he had been called down to the district attorney's office to
talk with them, so the Brown case must lie somewhere in between Ancira and
Bailey.9
In Lovel v. State96 the court affirmed a conviction which seems contrary to
88. Unfortunately the opinion does not make clear whether the evidence showed that these
items were connected to the defendant before he returned and confessed.
89. Id. at 320.
90. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
91. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that if the police officers had begun to focus their
investigation after the defendant had initiated the resumed conversation, the court would have
been presented with a different problem; here, however, the defendant "made the statement
after only one question, which could hardly be described as directed toward eliciting an
incriminating response." Id. Since the Bailey decision, the watchword "voluntary statement"
has appeared more frequently. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 536 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);
Craig v. State, 533 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
92. 516 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In Ancira the court stated that "the questioning
of Appellant by the officer in the police vehicle cannot be characterized as a general investigation
into an unsolved crime, nor was the questioning made under circumstances to bring it within the
ambit of general on-the-scene investigatory process." Id. at 926.
93. 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
94. 532 S.W.2d at 321.
95. The record in Brown reflected that the district attorney and the officers were making a
general investigation into an unsolved crime and were checking on all sources of information
about the deaths involved, so it was only natural for the district attorney to want to talk to the man
who had discovered the bodies. The defendant was informed at the time of the interview that he
was not under arrest and the investigations into the deaths had to start somewhere. The
defendant, accompanied by his uncle, had gone voluntarily to the prosecutor's office and left
with his uncle when the interview was concluded. 475 S.W.2d at 951.
96. 538 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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its 1971 decision in Tilley v. State97 even though the court in Lovel stated that
the "identical contention" had been considered in Tilley and found to be
without merit.9" Both cases affirmed misdemeanor convictions for driving
while intoxicated, and both dealt with oral statements which were held not
subject to Miranda nor to the requirements of article 38.22. In Tilley the
policeman investigating a traffic collision approached the defendant at the
scene for basic identity information and his version of the accident. Noticing
the odor of alcohol, he asked the defendant how much he had been drinking,
and the defendant made an incriminating statement which was the subject of
the appeal. In Lovel, however, the interview took place at the hospital
emergency room presumably after the two officers had completed their
investigation at the scene. When defendant vomited in the presence of the
officers while being sutured, the officers testified that the surgeon jumped
back and said, "you drunk son-of-a-gun." 9 Moreover, the surgeon then
immediately suggested an alcohol content blood test.'00 The test was ren-
dered, and it showed defendant to be legally intoxicated. Although the
opinion does not reveal whether the interview followed the test and its results,
it is fair to assume that the officers asked the defendant "what happened out
there?"'' after the stitching, vomiting, and the comments by the physician.
His incriminating response was the basis for the point on appeal. The officers
testified that they asked the question while merely concluding their investiga-
tion of the collision and that the defendant was not in custody or under
arrest.0 2 Based on that testimony the court held that the case was removed
from both Miranda and the Texas confession statute. 03
The factual details alone clearly show the two cases are not identical, and
Lovel should have been harder for the court to decide. Can there be any doubt
that the two police officers had already decided, at least in their own minds,
that they would at some time charge this person with the crime of driving
while intoxicated and that, at the moment they approached him to ask him
what happened, they knew his remarks might help them make their case? The
two cases are further distinguishable because in Tilley the court stated that
the remark in question was "res gestae,"' 1 which removed the case from
operation of article 38.22, and there was no mention of this important
distinction in the Lovel opinion. In withdrawing from the Miranda doctrine,
the courts are over emphasizing Miranda's concern with the coercive effect
of custody, which fails to consider the important policy question concerning
waiver of known rights.
Warning by a Magistrate. Despite the mandatory language of article 15.17
97. 462 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
98. 538 S.W.2d at 633.




103. If the officers testified as to the precise time and place of the arrest, it is not shown in the
opinion.
104. 462 S.W.2d at 595.
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of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 10 5 there has been no change in the blatant
failure of many Texas peace officers to follow its mandate, and the court of
criminal appeals regards compliance with this statute unimportant so long as
someone at some time gives a Miranda warning. Although it is still too soon to
measure the full significance of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Gerstein v. Pugh,'" which held that a person arrested must be given a
probable cause hearing promptly after arrest, no Texas case has yet indicated
any impact of the decision.
In one Texas case during the past year the state sought to excuse the delay
in bringing the defendant before a magistrate because other prisoners were
being processed when the defendant was brought to the police station. 107 The
court found the defendant's initial arrest illegal for lack of evidence, yet it
upheld the admission of his confession:
[T]he record does not reflect, nor is it contended, that any action was
taken by the officers which tended in any way to deprive appellant of his
capacity for self-determination. We conclude that the confessions taken
from appellant were not obtained by the exploitation of an illegal
arrest. 108
And in another case the court had no qualms about approving a confession
taken after a period of on and off interrogation lasting thirty-three hours,
although the prisoner had not been taken before a magistrate.'°9
Jackson v. Denno Hearing. Both federal constitutional law and the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure require a hearing outside the presence of the jury
to determine admissibility of a confession. 110 If the confession is then
admitted into evidence, the Texas statute further requires that the court
"must enter an order stating its findings, which order shall be filed among the
papers of the cause.""' When faced with the failure of the trial court to enter
an order with sufficient findings of fact to enable the appellate court to rule on
the issues, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has previously been divided
105. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (Vernon 1966) provides that:
In each case enumerated in this Code, the person making the arrest shall without
unnecessary delay take the person arrested or have him taken before some
magistrate of the county where the accused was arrested. The magistrate shall
inform in clear language the person arrested of the accusation against him and of
any affidavit filed therewith, of his right to retain counsel.
106. 420 U.S. 130 (1975). See also Steele, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 315, 316 (1976).
107. Dowdy v. State, 534 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The prosecution's argument in
Dowdy can also be applied in the reverse, however, since the officers could have easily taken the
defendant before a magistrate while waiting to book the defendant in jail.
108. Id. at 339-40.
109. Skidmore v. State, 530 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The defendant was arrested
in Los Angeles for a robbery-murder which occurred in El Paso. The court makes no mention,
and apparently the issue was never raised, whether such a prolonged interrogation prior to a
magistrate's warning was in derogation of California law. See CALIF. PENAL CODE ANN. § 849
(West Supp. 1976).
110. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 38.22
(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) which provides: "In all cases where a question is raised as to the
voluntariness of a confession or statement, the court must make an independent finding in the
absence of the jury as to whether the confession or statement was made under voluntary
conditions."
Ill. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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over whether the appeal should be abated to allow the making of such findings
or reversed. 112 The issue was resolved in 1976 when a unanimous court in two
separate cases determined that such an appeal will be abated to enable the trial
court to file belatedly its written fact findings, whether the trial judge had
failed to make any findings altogether" 3 or whether he made findings deemed
insufficient by the appellate court.' 14
The state usually has to show very little in order to justify a finding by the
trial court that a confession is voluntary, but in the total absence of prosecu-
tion evidence to contradict defense evidence that the confession was coerced,
the appellate court has no choice but to reverse. For example, in Sherman v.
State' ' the defendant testified that he was held incommunicado for two and
one-half months before his requests for appointment of counsel were met and
also that his confession was coerced by the threat that his refusal to sign
would mean either conviction as an habitual criminal or the death penalty.
Neither of the two officers who testified could contradict defendent's story
that he was threatened, since neither had been present when the supposedly
coercive statement was made. The principal interrogating officer inexplicably
failed to testify. Stressing the importance of the absent key witness, the court
stated that as little as an explanation of the witness' absence could have
justified the trial court in disbelieving the defendant." 6
Harmless Error. After finding the confession involuntary in Sherman v.
State 17 the court had no reason to examine whether failure to appoint counsel
was in violation of the doctrine of Escobedo v. Illinois."8 If the court had
found an Escobedo violation, it then would have had to determine whether
the violation rendered the confession involuntary or merely unlawful. This
was the holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. Estelle,1"9 in
which the court rejected the argument that the harmless error rule is never
applicable to rectify a confession held to have been admitted erroneously.120
The Fifth Circuit drew a distinction between "the genus of unlawful confes-
sions and the species of involuntary or coerced unlawful confessions ... "
by noting: "[A]lthough both types constitute very damaging evidence against
the accused, an unlawful confession may not be nearly as untrustworthy in
determining the defendant's guilt or innocence, or nearly as shocking to our
notions of fundamental due process, as an involutary confession certainly
is.'' In the Smith case, the Fifth Circuit found that the confession was
unlawful but not involuntary, thus making the harmless error rule applicable
112. Davis v. State, 499 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
113. McKittrick v. State, 535 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
114. Hester v. State, 535 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
115. 532 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
116. Id. at 636 n.2. In Dowdy v. State, 534 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the court
similarly bemoaned the failure of the record to show information justifying the defendant's
arrest, leading the court to the inexorable conclusion that the arrest was illegal.
117. 532 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
118. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
119. 527 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1976).
120. Id. at 431.
121. Id.
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to the case. The court remanded the case, however, for a fact finding to
determine whether the defendant had taken the stand because of the unlaw-
fully obtained confession, in which case the harmless error doctrine would
not save the conviction from reversal.
In Harper v. State22 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the
admission into evidence of the defendant's lie to the arresting officer to be
harmless. Defendant had told the policeman that the stolen car he was driving
belonged to his sister. The majority found that both the Miranda doctrine and
article 38.22 applied, 23 but that the conviction would not be reversed because
the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. 124 Judge Roberts, concurring, argued
that the lie was neither a confession nor the result of a custodial interrogation
but was merely a "simple exculpatory statement. ' 1 25 Presiding Judge Onion
took issue with both opinions. Quoting from a 1917 case 26 which described a
confession as a statement made by the accused "which the State seeks to use
to prove his guilt," he urged in his dissent that the lie would never have been
offered by the state unless it tended to show guilt. 27 And since the state
clearly offered it to bolster its case, he argued that its admission was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the conviction should have been
reversed.
Two cases during the survey period discussed the harmless error rule in
cases involving violations of the Bruton doctrine, 128 which forbids admission
in a joint trial of a co-defendant's confession which incriminates another
co-defendant. One case was reversed because the co-defendant's confession
supplied the indispensable missing links in the other defendant's own confes-
sion which tied him to the crime in question. 129 The court could not conclude
that the objectionable confession was "merely cumulative of other evidence
or that it did not add anything new to the statement made by appellant.' ' 30 In
the second case, the robbery convictions of three co-defendants were also
reversed, but with more difficulty, as the court divided three to two on the
question of whether the Burton errors were harmless.' 31 One of the defend-
ants, Coleman, had been the driver of the car but had been picked up by the
other two midway through their evening's spree in Houston. All of the
defendants had sought severance, and all objected to the admission of the
others' confessions. Coleman's conviction was reversed because the confes-
sions of the other two, who had actually perpetrated the robbery while he
waited in the car, contained information compromising his theory that he was
not guilty under the law of principals. The court concluded that the prosecu-
122. 533 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
123. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22
(Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
124. 533 S.W.2d at 777.
125. Id. at 778.
126. Dover v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. 545, 197 S.W. 192 (1917).
127. 533 S.W.2d at 780.
128. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
129. Evans v. State, 534 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The co-defendant's confession
supplied the time, date, and place of the offense.
130. Id. at 711.
131. Bass v. State, 527 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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tion's case against him would have been less persuasive without the benefit of
his co-defendant's confessions. 13 The convictions of the other two were
reversed because Coleman's confession contained evidence of two extrane-
ous offenses, which the court noted could not properly have been brought
before the jury otherwise. Therefore, the majority, represented by Presiding
Judge Onion, could not conclude that the Bruton error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. 133
Parolees and Probationers. Two recent cases make it clear that a probation
officer holds no exalted status and his probationer no inferior status in
deciding whether a probationer's confession to his probation officer will be
admitted into evidence. Noting that it had held the fourth amendment
applicable to probationers during the same term, 34 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held in Dowdy v. State13 that the same underlying rationale
dictates that a probationer is also not deprived of his fifth amendment rights.
In Creeks v. State136 the court enforced those rights, but only by a three-to-
two majority. 137
The United States Supreme Court left unresolved the question of whether
parole officers are required to advise parolees of their Miranda rights prior to
interrogating them. The Court remanded a pending case to the Ohio trial court
for a determination of whether the Ohio court had ruled the confession
inadmissible on the grounds of local law or the United States Constitution. 31
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
During the past year the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has been
protective of the right of privacy under the fourth amendment while the
United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a continued willingness to
erode this right. In fact, Justice Brennan has noted that recent decisions by
the Burger Court have marked "the continuing evisceration of Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures." 139
Motor Vehicle Searches. The law concerning searches of motor vehicles
was given significant treatment during the survey period by both the United
States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Exemplary
is an auto search case decided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. In Texas v. White" the Texas
132. Id. at 563.
133. Id. at 562.
134. Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
135. 534 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). For other discussion of Dowdy, see note 116
supra and accompanying text.
136. 542 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). For other discussion of Creeks, see notes 82-85
supra and accompanying text.
137. 542 S.W.2d at 853.
138. Ohio v. Gallagher, 96 S. Ct. 1438, 47.L. Ed. 2d 722 (1976).
139. United States v. Martinez-Fuertes, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1134 (1976).
For further discussion of Martinez-Fuertes see notes 153-57 infra and accompanying text.
140. 423 U.S. 67 (1975). White is a landmark case procedurally: in derogation of TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 6 the state appealed the decision of the court of criminal appeals and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. On remand the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals commented:
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court examined what type of circumstances in an automobile search would be
so exigent as to permit dispensing with the warrant requirement. Although the
court admitted that there was probable cause to search White's vehicle, it
found that justification for a warrantless search dissipated when the defend-
ant was placed in custody at the police station and his motor vehicle secured in
the breezeway of the station house. In an attempt to follow the leading
Supreme Court case in this area, Chambers v. Maroney,'4 1 the Texas court
excluded the evidence seized pursuant to this warrantless search, holding the
search to be unreasonable because the state had failed to demonstrate any
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the decision in a three-paragraph per curiam opin-
ion. 142 Despite the securing of the defendant's person and his motor vehicle,
the Supreme Court found the warrantless search reasonable because prob-
able cause was present, and the majority made no mention of whether the
circumstances were so exigent as to justify the failure of the state to obtain a
warrant. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, asserting that the factual
circumstances in White were far less compelling than those held to justify a
warantless search in Chambers.
Prior to the White decision, automobile search cases were not per se
exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement, but rather, as
evidenced by the Supreme Court's definitive opinion in Chambers,'43 the
reasonableness of the search depended upon surrounding circumstances: the
time of day, the physical location of the motor vehicle, the number of officers
present and other factors relating to the need for an immediate search of the
car. One question raised by the short per curiam opinion in White is whether
the Court is rejecting the factual analysis of Chambers which has heretofore
been relied upon. The answer to that question lies in subsequent decisions.
Two such decisions demonstrate the distinction between the manner in
which the Supreme Court and the court of criminal appeals deal with
inventory searches of motor vehicles. Both cases involved the seizure of
marijuana pursuant to an inventory search of the owner's glove compart-
ment, and although the facts seem quite similar, the bases for the decisions
differ substantially. In the case before the Supreme Court, the defendant's
car was inventoried at the police pound after being towed away for parking
violations, while in the Texas case the defendant's car was inventoried at the
scene of an auto accident prior to its being towed away. Both searches were
made pursuant to routine police procedures. The refinement of the concept of
privacy is reflected in the Supreme Court's opinion in South Dakota v.
We reiterate that we do not challenge the Supreme Court's holding in Texas v.
White; rather, we accord it its full binding effect. However, we do hold as a
matter of Texas criminal procedure that the State is, in the future, precluded from
appealing a criminal case-by certiorari or otherwise-from this Court to the
United States Supreme Court.
543 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (citations omitted).
141. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
142. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). Justice Marshall's dissent strongly resembled the
majority opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 68.
143. See also United States v. Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the notion that
an automobile search does not involve exigent circumstances per se is reiterated.
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Opperman,'" upholding the warrantless search. The tenor of the Court's
opinion is that persons protected by the fourth amendment have a diminished
expectation of privacy with respect to their automobiles because of the
multitude of governmental controls over motor vehicles and their operation.
In addition, the Court placed heavy emphasis upon routine police procedure
to inventory vehicles in order to protect the owner's property and to shield
police from civil liability for losses. Although the opinion of the court of
criminal appeals in Robertson v. State145 appears to rely upon the Opperman
rationale, such reliance is misplaced because the Texas court found that an
inventory is not a search as contemplated by the fourth amendment.
The distinction in the analyses in Opperman and Robertson is a logical
outgrowth of the difference in the definition of "search" employed by Texas
and by federal courts. A recent example of the Texas view is contained in
Long v. State,146 where the court defined a search as follows: "A search
means, of necessity, a quest, a looking for, or a seeking out of that which
offends against the law. This implies a prying into hidden places for that
which is concealed.' 1 47 In its most recent statement of what constitutes a
search, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a search occurs when the
government, in seeking out information not otherwise available, invades a
citizen's right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property,
thereby violating the privacy upon which he justifiably relies.'" A compari-
son of these state and federal interpretations clearly shows that the Texas
view is much more restrictive. Hence, the Robertson and Opperman deci-
sions reach the same results, but the Texas court found no search to have
taken place, while the Supreme Court held that a motor vehicle inventory,
although admittedly a search, is reasonable if conducted pursuant to routine
police procedures. The heavy emphasis placed upon routine police proce-
dures by both courts presents another troublesome aspect of these cases
because this may open the door for police agencies to bootstrap their way into
valid seizures by merely expanding the scope of their routine inventory into
the trunks of automobiles and other areas.
Search of Person Incident to Lawful Traffic Arrest. In recent years the
Supreme Court has ruled that a search of the person incident to a lawful traffic
arrest is valid, 149 and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dealt with the scope
of such a search under the Chimel v. California doctrine 150 in Beck v. State. I5'
The facts of this case recur so frequently that they are worthy of detailed
reproduction here. The arresting officers observed the defendant make a turn
without signalling and pulled him over to the roadside. As the vehicles were
144. 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976).
145. 541 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
146. 532 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
147. Id. at 594.
148. United States v. Burnett, 526 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1976).
149. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
150. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
151. No. 50,498 (Tex. Crim. App., July 7, 1976). Motion for rehearing had been granted. No.
50,498 (Tex. Crim. App., July 20, 1976).
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coming to a halt, the officers observed the defendant make a move toward the
glove compartment of his vehicle. After stopping, the defendant exited his
truck and remained near the driver's door. At this point, one arresting officer
searched the defendant while the other examined the glove compartment of
the vehicle and found marijuana. Holding the search unreasonable, the court
emphasized the fact that the glove compartment was outside the physical
scope of the defendant's reach, and thereby outside the legal scope of a
search incident to a lawful arrest.
The physical distance between the defendant and the glove compartment
should have been sufficient basis upon which to rest the decision, but the
court went further, observing that the arrest took place at dusk rather than
late at night and did not occur in a high crime area. The court also noted that
the officers outnumbered the defendant, that the officers did not fear danger
to themselves, and that the defendant did not appear to be intoxicated. These
factors were totally unnecessary for an analysis of this search problem. They
would more properly be determinative, however, in a stop and frisk
confrontation. 52
Crossing International Borders. A survey of search and seizure law would
be remiss if it did not mention the intrusion upon a citizen's privacy when
crossing international borders. The Supreme Court significantly diluted
protection against these intrusions in a trilogy of cases in this area. 53 In
United States v. Martinez-Fuertes 5 4 the Court acknowledged that any stop of
a motor vehicle is a seizure within the purview of the fourth amendment, but
the Court further held that the stopping at a permanent checkpoint of every
vehicle when traveling on a primary artery at or near the border is not an
unreasonable intrusion upon the privacy of citizens. Moreover, the Court
approved a "secondary" investigation of each motor vehicle and its passen-
gers even if the patrol officers have less than reasonable suspicion that a
vehicle contains illegal aliens, thereby lessening the test announced in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce."' The Court conducted its usual balancing test,
weighing the governmental interest in preventing the influx of illegal aliens
against the supposed minimal intrusion upon the freedom of citizens.
The expectation of privacy still appears to be an important factor here,
however, because the checkpoints must display significant signs and warn-
ings that an intrusion is about to occur. Second, the Court placed heavy
emphasis not only upon the administrative expertise of the border patrol but
152. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a
recent Fifth Circuit decision upholding the frisk of motor vehicle passengers after the driver has
been arrested see United States v. Thorpe, 536 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1976), reversing the original
decision of the three-judge bench.
153. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (officers at inland traffic checkpoints
may not search private vehicles without probable cause); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975) (investigative stops by roving patrols approved under Terry rationale when
reasonable suspicion exists that vehicle contains illegal aliens); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266(1973) (probable cause required prior to searches conducted by roving border
patrol officers).
154. 96S. Ct. 3074,49 L. Ed. 2d I116 (1976).
155. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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also upon statistics showing the increase in influx of illegal aliens during
recent years, The rule emanating from Martinez-Fuertes seems to be based
upon the rationales of the regulatory inspection cases 56 and the stop and frisk
cases. 5 The need for inspection, determined by the expertise of the border
patrol, is coupled with the reasonable suspicion of the law enforcement
agencies that illegal activity will occur on the public highway where the
checkpoint is established, and on the basis of Martinez-Fuertes, further
refinement of the law of search and seizure regarding border related confron-
tations can be expected.
Seizure of the Person. During recent months two cases involving the war-
rantless arrest of a person based upon probable cause when officers had full
opportunity to procure a warrant were rendered, one by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the other by the United States Supreme Court.
Notwithstanding an inability to rely upon Supreme Court decisions which
would soon be forthcoming, the Fifth Circuit in a per curiam opinion quickly
disposed of the issue of whether such a warrantless arrest violates fourth
amendment privacy rights.' During the same time period the United States
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Watson 59 that a warrantless arrest
by postal inspectors in a public place was based on probable cause and was
not violative of the fourth amendment despite a five-day period during which
the inspectors could have obtained a warrant.' 6° The true import of the
Watson decision was difficult to discern since the Court relied upon a specific
statute granting postal inspectors special authority to arrest, 6' while at the
same time taking great pains to trace the historical development of the
common law right to arrest without a warrant. The opinion seemed further
tempered by emphasis upon the fact that the arrest occurred in a public place.
Several months later, however, the Supreme Court removed all doubts as to
the impact of the Watson decision in United States v. Santana. 62 The Court
in a single sentence made clear that any warrantless arrest based on probable
cause which occurs in a public place is reasonable, regardless of the presence
or absence of a special statutory authorization.163 Thus, a dichotomy within
the law of search and seizure has been crystallized by the Santana and
Watson decisions. The warrantless seizure of one's person in a public place
based upon probable cause is condoned despite the ability of the arresting
officers to obtain a warrant, while the sanctity of one's home or office is
preserved by the general requirement of a probable cause determination by a
neutral and detached magistrate. It therefore seems that the United States
156. See, e.g., See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
157. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
158. United States v. Burnett, 526 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1976).
159. 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976).
160. 96 S. Ct. at 824, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 602.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a) (1970).
162. 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976). The Santana decision is additionally important
because it illustrates a revitalization of the "hot pursuit" doctrine of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967).
163. 96 S. Ct. at 2409, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 305.
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Supreme Court has judicially determined that the fourth amendment extends
more protections to the sanctity of one's home than to that of his person.
Privacy. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals displayed precocity in ruling
that a grand jury subpoena to a bank requesting the defendant's financial
statement is not violative of the fourth amendment. 164 Less than two months
later the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller 165 ruled that even a
defective subpoena issued by a United States Attorney for checks and other
bank records of the defendant was not an unreasonable intrusion under the
fourth amendment.166 According to the Court, a citizen has no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to his own checks and deposit slips, copies of which
the bank maintains pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act.167 The language of the
Court in Miller seems to leave a person's protection of his or her private
papers intact. Later in the term, however, the Court in Andresen v. Mary-
land'68 approved a warrant to search an attorney's office which gave the
officers general authority to seize certain documents "together with other
fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown."' 69
Historians of fourth amendment development would be particularly dis-
turbed by the import of this decision as it condones the use of general
authority to search as well as to seize a citizen's private papers.170 The Court
tempered its approval of general authority in the warrant in question by
pointing out that the wording of a warrant's purpose always dictates its scope,
but Andresen nevertheless represents another reflection of the growing
erosion of the right to privacy within the federal system.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently has exhibited a more
solicitous attitude toward this right. In considering the open fields exception
to the "curtilage" doctrine,' 7' the court recognized that the physical location
of shrubbery surrounding a rural residence is indicative of the occupant's
expectation of privacy.1 72 Thus, while finding the open fields exception
applicable to the case at bar, the court took pains to discuss examination of a
photograph of the defendant's residence in order to ascertain the precise
location of the foliage as well as the vantage point of the observing officers in
determining the owner's right to privacy. In a case even more protective of
that right the court ruled that the lessee of a mini-warehouse has a reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. 173 Finally, in a case of
first impression the court held that a waiver of fourth amendment rights
164. United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1976).
165. 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976).
166. Id. at 1624, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 79.
167. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (Supp. .1976).
168. 96 S. Ct. 2737,49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). See further discussion of Andresen, note 59 supra
and accompanying text.
169. 96 S. Ct. at 2748, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 642.
170. See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1937); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1966); A. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969).
171. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
172. Ochs v. State, 543 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App.. 1976).
173. Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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contained in an agreement specifying conditions of probation was too broad,
and, therefore, violated the probationer's right of privacy. 174 In its opinion the
court noted that there is a split of authority in the United States concerning the
validity of such waivers, but it nevertheless decided to exert a more protec-
tive attitude than some courts toward the somewhat diminished right of a
probationer to expect privacy.
The Exclusionary Rule. During the survey period the United States Su-
preme Court considered the exclusionary rule in two important cases. 75 In
United States v. Janis17 6 the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to a
civil tax proceeding even though evidence of the matter was admittedly
tainted. In Stone v. Powell' the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal
courts to entertain collateral attacks on state convictions based upon illegally
seized evidence was severely restricted because the Court ruled that there is
no constitutional requirement for the federal court to extend habeas corpus
relief to a state prisoner even though illegally seized evidence was introduced
at his trial, if the state court system has provided him a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim. Although Janis and Stone
admittedly differ in their factual and procedural contexts, the analysis in both
opinions reflects a balancing test of the presumed deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule versus the detriment to societal interests when the rule is
applied. The impact of the Stone opinion is unclear, however; it may merely
be concerned with the construction of a federal statute 17 or it may portend the
ultimate demise of the exclusionary rule in both state and federal proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, we can take solace in the Texas court's willingness to
extend application of the exclusionary rule to proceedings collateral to an
actual criminal trial. 179
IV. DISCOVERY
Although not the first case to enunciate the constitutional doctrine bearing
its name, 8 the 1963 case of Brady v. Maryland18' began a period of increased
litigation about a prosecuting attorney's obligation to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense. This was characterized by uncertainty over the test
for determining prejudicial error' 82 and the mechanics for determining
whether that rule had been violated. 183
174. Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1976). Contra, People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759,488
P.2d 630, 98 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1971).
175. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976); United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct.
3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976).
176. 96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976).
177. 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) (federal habeas corpus remedy for state court actions).
179. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decisions concerning probation revocation are
particularly noteworthy because the applicability of the exclusionary rule to such proceedings is
not questioned by the court. See, e.g., Ablon v. State, 537 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1976); Tamez v.
State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1976), discussed in note 174 supra and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935).
181. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
182. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
183. See, e.g., Fernandez v. State, 516 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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The symbol of this debate was a quaint document known as the "Brady
Motion" which demanded production of all evidence favorable to the ac-
cused. Because of the United States Supreme Court opinion in United States
v. Agurs184 the Brady Motion is only of historical interest now, and much of
the prior uncertainty of the preceding thirteen years is ended as well.
One may quarrel with the spiritual direction of the seven member majority
who have bridled the Brady doctrine,185 but it is difficult to criticize the care
with which the junior member of the Court, Justice Stevens, enunciated in
Agurs the majority's perception of the doctrine. He classified the three kinds
of suppression cases, then laid down three corresponding standards of
materiality. The first is those cases where it was discovered after trial that the
prosecution case included perjured testimony; 86 the second category in-
cludes those cases in which the prosecuting attorney had failed or refused to
reveal material evidence which had been specifically requested by the de-
fense;'87 and in the third are those cases in which there is only a general
request for exculpatory information, or no request at all.' 88
The Agurs case fell into the third category. The defendant was a prostitute
convicted of killing a man in a cheap hotel room, where employees discovered
her and the decedent, already stabbed, in a struggle over the knife. She
claimed self-defense, and the basis of her appeal under the Brady doctrine
was the prosecution's failure to volunteer knowledge that the decedent had a
prior conviction record for assault and carrying deadly weapons. 189
The Supreme Court explained how different standards of materiality apply
to each of the three types of Brady cases. In those fundamentally unfair cases
where the prosecution used perjured testimony, a "strict standard of mate-
riality" would apply because such cases "involve a corruption of the truth-
seeking function of the trial process." In the second category, where the
defense had requested specific information which was denied it, the test is
whether the suppressed evidence "might have affected the outcome of the
trial."9' In the least offensive form of Brady violation, the third category, the
court pondered what standard of materiality should be applied. In arriving at
its conclusion the Court put to rest the notion that the outcome would turn on
the culpability of the prosecutor, 9' and rejected the "might affect" standard:
For a jury's appraisal of a case 'might' be affected by an improper or
trivial consideration as well as by evidence giving rise to a legitimate
184. 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976).
185. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented.
186. The Court regards this first category as the most egregious type of Brady case.
187. The Brady case itself fell into this category. In Brady a co-defendant's exculpatory
statement was kept from the defense.
188. 96 S. Ct. at 2399, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 351-52.
189. Id. at 2395-96, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 348. It is unfortunate that a major case in this area should
involve the suppression of evidence which is readily obtainable and obviously material. The
defendant's prior criminal record in a self-defense case is not a typical example of evidence found
improperly suppressed under Brady doctrine cases.
190. Id. at 2398, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 350.
191. The Court noted that "if the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is
because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor." Id. at 2400,49 L.
Ed. 2d at 353.
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doubt on the issue of guilt. If everything that might influence a jury must
be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitution-
al duty would be to allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of
routine practice. 1
92
The Court also specifically rejected the customary "harmless error" stand-
ard characterized by Kotteakos v. United States, 193 requiring the reviewing
judge to set aside the conviction unless he is certain that the error either did
not influence the jury or affected it only slightly. "Unless every nondisclo-
sure is regarded as automatic error," Justice Stevens said, "the constitutional
standard of materiality must impose a higher burden on the defendant:"' 94
The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern
with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if
supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It
necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been com-
mitted. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of
the entire record . . . . If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt
whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justifica-
tion for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of
questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance
might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.195
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, complaining of the majority's
narrow definition of material evidence because, they contended, it will create
"an incentive for the prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in
favor of concealment.' 1
One effect of the decision is to make worthless the customary general
demand for evidence helpful to the defense. In its opinion the Court points out
that no significant difference exists between cases in which merely a general
request for exculpatory matter is made and cases in which no request at all is
made. 197 Instead, it now becomes very important that a defendant make a
specific demand if at all possible because on appeal his burden will be easier if
it can be shown that the prosecutor suppressed something specifically re-
quested. Thus, "specificity," the nemesis of discovery efforts under article
39.14,18 the anemic Texas discovery statute, now burdens defense efforts to
invoke Brady as well. Will it satisfy the specificity requirements of Agurs to
file a "shotgun" motion, specifically setting forth every item of evidence
within a defense lawyer's imagination? The answer is probably not, unless the
record shows some additional effort to put prosecuting attorneys on notice. 199
192. Id. at 2400, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 352-53.
193. 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
194. 96 S. Ct. at 2401, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 354.
195. Id. at 2401-02, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 354-55 (footnotes omitted).
196. Id. at 2404, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 358.
197. Id at 2399, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 351-52.
198. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.14 (Vernon 1966).
199. How properly to apply the reasonable doubt test to mitigating evidence is an issue raised
by the Court's decision in Agurs. This issue is especially vexing in states with bifurcated jury
trials. The problem of how to enforce the defense's mandate also remains unsettled. For
example, should defense counsel routinely call prosecuting attorneys as witnesses in post-trial
hearings to ask about their knowledge of suppressed evidence?
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Although the Court's extremely difficult test for materiality dispels any
hope for an expansion of the Brady doctrine, it is not inconsistent with the
developing trends known to Texas practitioners. The Fifth Circuit has made
clear its reluctance to reverse except where the effect of missing evidence on
a jury's decision would be "considerably above the level of speculation." 200
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has followed suit in finding suppression
harmless after considering its effect on the outcome of the trial, 20 1 which is the
standard uniformly applied in Texas cases. It is interesting to contemplate
what effect the Agurs decision might have had on two leading Texas cases
which were reversed under the Brady doctrine. In both Crutcher v. State0 2
and Ridyolph v. State20 3 the court applied the "may have had an effect on the
outcome" standard, which under Agurs is reserved only for those cases
where prosecuting attorneys had been put on notice by specific requests. In
each no specific request had been made and the defense did not know about
the information suppressed until after the trial. Ridyolph involved failure to
disclose to the defense a witness who could have corroborated the defensive
theory of negligent homicide. Without reviewing all of the evidence in the
case, it is impossible to say whether the court would have reversed also had it
applied the test of whether there arose a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not
otherwise exist. It should be noted, however, that both the trial judge and the
prosecuting attorney had entirely overlooked the evidence which led to
reversal, so it is certainly plausible that that case would have been affirmed
had it been decided after Agurs. Crutcher involved suppression of an
important prior inconsistent statement of a prosecution witness. Since it
merely involved a matter of impeaching that witness, Crutcher too would
likely have been affirmed had the reasonable doubt test been applied. That
case, however, could be said to fall within the Supreme Court's category of
perjured testimony cases with its strict definition of materiality. If so, the
result would have been the same.
The decision of an appellate court can be subjective regardless of the test
applied. The 1976 case of Love v. State,204 decided before Agurs, applied the
"may have had an effect" test. Since there was a specific request for
particular information concerning dying declarations of the decedent, the
"might affect" test would seem to have been the proper test even under
Agurs. The Brady case is itself an example of a specific request, and the test
of materiality in such a case remains what it was under Brady: whether the
evidence "might have affected the outcome of the trial.' '205 Despite applica-
bility of the test more favorable to the appellant, the Texas court affirmed,
finding that the evidence of Love's guilt was overwhelming and that the
suppressed evidence would not have changed the result.
If federal constitutional law fails him, a defendant, convicted without the
benefit of evidence which might have helped him, can file a grievance against
200. Ross v. Texas, 474 F.2d 1150, 1153 (5th Cir. 1973).
201. Hill v. State, 504 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
202. 481 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
203. 503 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
204. 533 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
205. United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 350 (1976).
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the prosecuting attorney, invoking Disciplinary Rule 7-103(b) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility2" which requires a public prosecutor to disclose
to the defendant the existence of evidence tending to negate or mitigate the
offense. But he need not bother filing a civil suit against the prosecutor for a
violation of his civil rights, since the United States Supreme Court held in
1976 that under section 1983207 a public prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity
from civil suit in suppression of evidence cases.20
There is little encouragement in recent cases for defense counsel trying to
prepare a criminal case for trial. The decisions appear to reward prosecution
chicanery or, at the most, to chasten the prosecution 'with language such as
"while we do not condone" and "although fairness required," 2° but at the
same time affirming the convictions. To say that a sporting theory of justice
prevails in Texas criminal cases is euphemistic. There is nothing sporting
about the gauntlet which the defense must run in its efforts to be prepared to
present to the fact finders the evidence and argument most favorable to the
defendant. In Florio v. State210 the defense requeste d all scientific tests,
including blood tests. The opinion does not make clear, unfortunately, the
exact form of the motion, the state's response, or whetherthe court refused to
disclose tests which were available or whether the defense was actively
misled into thinking there were none. After the defendant himself had placed
a pistol in evidence, however, evidence of blood on the butt of the pistol was
brought out to defendant's detriment. He complained on appeal that he never
would have introduced the gun in the first place had he known of the blood
evidence. The court also failed to make plain its precise reason for rejecting
the complaint on appeal. Brady doctrine law apparently was applied, since
the court cited Means v. State2H and said that failure to disclose the evidence
prior to trial "was not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal. 212
The Florio case illustrates still another growing practice: the police and
sometimes the prosecution secrete witnesses or isolate them from defense
contact. For example, while finding that the assistant district attorney had
instructed the witness who knew about the blood on the butt of the pistol not
to talk to defense counsel although requests for contact had been made and an
appointment arranged but not met, the court of criminal appeals merely
admonished the prosecution in Florio for behavior which was "not to be
condoned." 213 A similar complaint was raised in Sigard v. State,214 a heroin
sale case which involved the question of whether the San Antonio police had
procured the absence of an informer witness. After cataloguing the good faith
efforts of the police to find the witness to serve him with the defendant's trial
subpoena, the court resolved the case by concluding that the sixth amend-
206. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 (Vernon 1973).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
208. Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984, 46 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1976).
209. Florio v. State, 532 S.W.2d 614, 616-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
210. Id.
211. 429 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
212. 532 S.W.2d at 616.
213. Id. at 617.
214. 537 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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ment does not require the state to be successful in subpoenaing witnesses.
The court so ruled despite evidence that the police had given the witness $75
and may have invited him to disappear. Judge Odom dissented, noting that a
recitation of the diligence used by the state to find the witness missed the
point, since their failure to do so only served to demonstrate all the more
dramatically how successful the disappearance was in the first place.2"5 This
case would be less remarkable but for the 1974 case of White v. State, 16 a
similar San Antonio case which, on rehearing, finally turned on the failure of
the defense to put the correct address on his subpoena application. It was a
sale of heroin case, as was Sigard, and it also involved the absence of an
informer witness who had received money from the police with the recom-
mendation that he leave town for his own safety. Judge Odom dissented in
that case also. It seems the San Antonio narcotics police have discovered a
way to avoid the mandate of Roviaro v. United States217 that the identity of
informers who are also witnesses be revealed for use by the defense as fact
witnesses.
V. MULTIPLE OFFENSES
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was asked frequently during the
survey period to determine whether multiple convictions arising from identi-
cal or largely overlapping fact situations violate the state constitution's ban on
multiple jeopardy."' While the basic rule to be applied remains well estab-
lished, 1 9 the more difficult cases evidence a certain degree of confusion over
the law. The simpler appeals, on the other hand, seem to arise either from an
excess of zeal or a lack of due care on the part of some prosecutors.
Most of the cases are easily explained under the settled rule that the state
may carve as large an offense out of a single transaction as possible, but it
must cut only once. 220 This "carving doctrine" has been recently applied in
several cases to multiple offenses arising from such single transactions as
robbery by assault and subsequent theft of victim's car, 221 simultaneous
seizure of heroin and narcotics paraphernalia, 222 simultaneous seizure of
marijuana and heroin, 223 sexual assaults upon and subsequent robberies of
three teenage girls, 224 robbery by firearms and murder with malice, 225 and
robbery by assault and assault with intent to murder. 226 An interesting
variation is provided in the dictum of McCaleb v. State,227 a case arising from
215. Id. at 739.
216. 517 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975).
217. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
218. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 14.
219. "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor
shall a person again be put on trial for the same offense, after a verdict of not guilty in a court of
competent jurisdiction." Id.
220. Douthit v. State, 482 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
221. Exparte Evans, 530 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 19"75).
222. Ex parte Santillan, 532 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
223. Ex parte Adams, 541 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
224. Tatum v. State, 534 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
225. Ex parte Thomas, 538 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Exparte Farris, 538 S.W.2d
134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Ex parte Jewel, 535 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
226. Ex parte Hilliard, 538 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
227. 537 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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an extended con game. There the court noted that "where one scheme has
been relied upon and all of the transactions have been proved and where there
has not been an election, the State cannot prosecute upon the individual
transactions in subsequent cases .... ,,228 In this instance the "scheme" is
apparently the "transaction."
Excess reliance on the "single transaction" test often will prove misplaced,
however, and several cases which appear on their faces to come within the
"single transaction" test have been held to fall outside it as the court applied
various other tests. For example, on two recent occasions the court of
criminal appeals has held that if the first offense is "complete" before the
second is initiated, the two incidents are not part of the same transaction.
Thus, in Hawkins v. State 29 separate convictions for possession of a sawed-
off shotgun and for a robbery committed with the gun were upheld because
the possession offense was complete before the commission of the robbery
occurred. 23 Similarly, in Robinson v. State23 convictions for criminal tres-
pass and for theft of a bicycle from the University of Houston campus were
separate transactions since the trespass was "complete as soon as the
defendant entered the grounds. 232 A comparison of Robinson with Exparte
Evans,233 where the defendant robbed and shot the victim, forced him to run
away, and then stole his car, is instructive. In Evans the court of criminal
appeals held the robbery and theft to be parts of the same transaction because
"the time sequence of events was continuous; " 234 thus, the distinguishing
feature was that "continuous . . .assaultive action" 235 was used to accom-
plish both the robbery and the car theft. It may not be possible to predict the
outcome of a given case, however, even by combining the "same transac-
tion" and "continuous assaultive action" tests. This is illustrated by Exparte
Caldwel 236 where separate convictions of a defendant for robbery and for
rape were affirmed. The defendant had robbed a hamburger chain employee
at gunpoint in one room of the drive-in, then raped her in another, and the
court of criminal appeals reasoned "that the robbery and the rape did not
occur in a single transaction, or in the same place or at the same time." 2 37
When two offenses are proved with essentially the same evidence, some
very complex problems can arise, as Wilson v. State238 indicates. The
defendant in Wilson had set a fire in his jail cell, and the deputy sheriff while
removing him suffered smoke inhalation and was attacked by the defendant
and wounded with a knife. Although the knifing was introduced into evidence
and proved at the defendant's trial for arson, a subsequent prosecution for
attempted capital murder of a peace officer was held not to be barred by prior
228. Id. at 731.
229. 535 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
230. Id. at 362.
231. 530 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
232. Id. at 593.
233. 530 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
234. Id. at 592.
235. Id.
236. 537 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
237. Id. at 266.
238. 541 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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jeopardy. The court reasoned that because the knife attack was not required
to be proven to aggravate the arson from a second to a first degree felony,
239
the second conviction for causing bodily injury and aggravated assault could
stand also. Another approach to the "same evidence" problem was taken by
Judge Onion in his concurrence in Graves v. State.24 In that case the
defendant was convicted for driving while intoxicated ("DWI") after his
vehicle jumped a curb and struck a thirteen-year-old girl. Following his DWI
conviction, the girl died, and the defendant was indicted and convicted for
involuntary manslaughter despite his plea of prior jeopardy. Judge Onion, in
considering the contention that DWI is a lesser offense included within
automobile manslaughter, 24 1 reasoned that by definition a lesser included
offense "is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense charged. 242 Since a DWI convic-
tion requires proof that the offense occurred on a public road or highway, and
involuntary manslaughter has no such requirement, DWI is not a lesser
offense included in the drunk-driving manslaughter charge.
One question pertinent to almost all of the cases discussed is why did the
prosecutor fail to make an election of charges. In Ex parte Thomas,243 for
example, the court felt compelled to set aside the defendant's murder
conviction simply because the robbery charge arising from the same incident
bore a lower degree indictment. In Ex parte Adams 244 the same situation
caused reversal of a heroin conviction while the defendant's marijuana
conviction was affirmed. 245
Prior jeopardy is an error considered so fundamental that it cannot be
waived, expressly or constructively. In Ex parte Jewe 246 the defendant's
second conviction arising from a robbery-murder was set aside in a habeas
corpus proceeding even though the defendant had pleaded guilty to the
second charge without pleading prior jeopardy and had taken no appeal. In Ex
parte Caldwe1 247 the court took notice of the error even though the petition-
er's application for habeas corpus failed to raise the issue.
239. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(b) (Vernon 1974) increases the second degree felony of
arson to a first degree felony if any bodily injury is caused by the fire. The smoke inhalation here
was deemed a bodily injury sufficient to increase the arson felony. The knife attack could not
have been used to aggravate the arson offense since it was not connected to the fire itself.
240. 539 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
241. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
242. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(l) (Vernon Supp, 1976-77). The court's difficulty
in reaching a result in this case is illustrated by the judges' inability to agree on a line of reasoning
supportive of the decision. Judge Douglas concurs with Judge Odom's reasoning only to the
extent that "separate and distinct offenses were shown" when the defendant continued driving
down the road some distance after striking the girl. 539 S.W.2d at 894. Judge Morrison relied on
cases dating back to Curtis v. State, 3 S.W. 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1886), in his majority opinion. In
Curtis the court held that where a victim of an offense dies subsequent to the defendant's
conviction for that offense, prosecution for the death is not barred by prior jeopardy. The
defendant could not have been prosecuted for the "same offense" before death that existed after
death. 539 S.W.2d at 891. Of the three opinions in Graves, only Judge Morrison discusses the
"same transaction" problem.
243. 538 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see note 225 supra and accompanying text.
244. 541 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see note 223 supra and accompanying text.
245. See also Valdez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
246. 535 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see note 225 supra and accompanying text.




In the past year the court of criminal appeals decided several challenges to
the validity of the new felony sentence enhancement2 48 statute, and clarified a
wide variety of problems concerning its application. Perhaps the most pre-
dictable constitutional challenge is that enhancement on the basis of an
offense committed prior to the new code's enactment2 49 violates the federal
prohibition against ex post facto laws. 250 However, this argument was made
and rejected in Shaw v. State25" ' on the authority of Graham v. West
Virginia .252
A more interesting constitutional contention was raised in Armendariz v.
State,211 where the defendant argued that the enhancement statute was being
selectively and arbitrarily applied, violating both the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment as elaborated in Furman v. Georgia .254 Conced-
ing that the unavailability of penitentiary papers in some cases as well as the
invalidity of prior convictions in others makes it impossible to apply the
enhancement statute to all offenders with prior convictions, the court of
criminal appeals held that the facts fell short of showing the "intention and
purposeful discrimination" 25 5 which would be required to set aside the statute
on fourteenth amendment grounds. Concerning the cruel and unusual punish-
ment argument, the court quoted Thrash v. State256 that "the enhanced
penalty statutes have been held valid against all constitutional attack, 257 and
concluded that the new statute also will be upheld despite challenges.
Several well established rules interpreting the prior enhancement statute
have now been reinforced as applicable to the new statute. In Carvajal v.
State258 the court provided an instructive discussion of the new statute's
legislative history in applying the rule that "using the same two prior
convictions to enhance punishment more than once is clearly error.' 259 Nor
can a prior conviction which was used successfully for enhancement pur-
poses under the old Penal Code be used again under the new code. The
exception to this rule, moreover, which allows a prior conviction used once
for second-offense enhancement to be used again in a habitual offender case,
is also carried forward. Further, discussion of the mandatory life penalty in an
habitual felon case during voir dire or trial is still prohibited. 26°
One novel theory advanced against enhancement was rejected by the court,
but in so doing the court suggested that under the proper set of facts it would
248. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon 1974).
249. The Texas Penal Code went into effect January 1, 1974.
250. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
251. 529 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
252. 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
253. 529 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
254. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
255. 529 S.W.2d at 528.
256. 500 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
257. 529 S.W.2d at 527.
258. 529 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
259. Id. at 521.
260. Ex parte White, 538 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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consider the theory again. In Watson v. State 2 6 the defendant contended that
section 29.03 of the Penal Code 26 2 is a special enhancement statute relating
only to robbery, and controls in robbery cases over the general provisions of
section 12.42. The court rejected the argument in Wilson, but specifically
reserved the question of whether section 31.03 of the code 263 might be
interpreted as special enhancement provisions controlling theft cases.
If attacks on the validity of the new enhancement statute are to be without
merit, however, there is at least fertile ground for defense attorneys to attack
the prior convictions that are alleged for purposes of enhancement by the
prosecution. Perhaps the most common defect to be found in prior convic-
tions is the state's failure to provide indigent defendants with counsel in cases
tried prior to Gideon v. Wainwright .264 The court of criminal appeals reviewed
the basic premises in Bray v. State,265 and held that the defendant bears the
burden of showing that he was indigent, without counsel and did not waive
counsel voluntarily. Where the defendant offers evidence that he was indi-
gent and without counsel, however, the burden shifts to the state to prove
waiver, which "cannot be presumed from a silent record.' 266 Bray involved a
prior conviction which originally resulted in a probated sentence, and lack of
counsel at a probation revocation hearing was held equally as fatal for
enhancement purposes to the later conviction as was lack of counsel at the
trial itself. Similarly, absence of counsel at sentencing renders a prior
conviction invalid for enhancement purposes where it is found that there was
a real probability that presence of counsel might have resulted in probation or
suspension of sentence. 267
Two recent cases illustrate the extent to which this reasoning can some-
times be applied. In Ex parte Woodard21 the enhancement allegation of a
felony DWI conviction was held invalid where the defendant was not repre-
sented by counsel at his misdemeanor DWI trial for which conviction was a
prerequisite to the felony second offense. And in McDonald v. Estelle 69
introduction of an uncounselled felony conviction was held to warrant
reversal and new trial even though the prior conviction had not been alleged
261. 532 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
262. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (Vernon 1974) provides: "(a) A person commits an
offense if he commits robbery as defined in Section 29.02 of this code, and he: (1) causes serious
bodily injury to another; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. (b) An offense under this section
is a felony of the first degree."
263. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon 1974) provides:
(d) An offense under this section is:
(2) Class B midemeanor if:(B) the value of the property stolen is less than $5 and the defendant has
previously been convicted of any grade of theft:
(4) a felony of the third degree if:
(C) the value of the property stolen is less than $200 and the defendant
has been previously convicted two or more times of any grade of
theft.
264. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
265. 531 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
266. Id. at 634.
267. Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Gutierrez v. Estelle, 474 F.2d 899
(5th Cir. 1973).
268. 541 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
269. 536 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1976).
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for enhancement, but merely introduced during the punishment phase as
evidence of the defendant's "prior criminal record.""27 The Court held that
such error was not "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."27 1 Where the only
objection, however, is that the prior sentence does not reflect that the
defendant was represented by counsel, and neither a motion to quash the
indictment which alleges the prior conviction nor an objection to its introduc-
tion was made by defense counsel, the court would find no error.
Section 12.42(d) of the Penal Code requires that the second of two prior
convictions alleged in an habitual felon case must have been committed after
conviction of the first has become final. This requirement has proved a trap
for careless prosecutors on at least two recent occasions. Even though the
first and second offenses alleged for enhancement were separated by ten
years in Tyra v. State,272 and thirteen years in Wiggins v. State,2 3 the state's
failure in each case to offer proof that the first conviction was final before the
second offense occurred was held to render the sentences invalid. In both of
these cases sentence had been imposed by the court rather than the jury, so
that only the issue of punishment had to be retried, but the legal issue is clear.
There are, however, limits to this requirement. Strict proof is not required-
the state can allege in an indictment that the first of two prior convictions
alleged resulted in a final conviction before the commission of the second and
the absence of specific dates will not be fatal to the indictment.274
When prosecutors experience delays in obtaining the penitentiary papers
needed to prove prior convictions for enhancement, another procedural
problem can develop, as illustrated in Henson v. State.2 5 In that case the
defendant was indicted for burglary, and counsel was appointed for him.
Three days before trial defendant was re-indicted on the same charge, but as
an habitual offender. The case went to trial as scheduled. Although defendant
did not raise the point, it was held on appeal that the defendant had been
denied effective assistance of counsel because his appointed counsel had not
been given ten days to prepare for the trial, as mandated by article 26.04 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, to defend against the enhancement allegations.
In the absence of an express waiver of the preparation period, the court
ordered a re-hearing on punishment.
Other procedural errors have been treated more leniently in the enhance-
ment area. The absence of a written waiver of jury trial from a penitentiary
packet will not, of itself, overcome the "presumption of regularity" accorded
a prior judgment which did recite that jury trial had been waived.276 Similarly,
failure of the trial court to sign or approve an agreement to waive confronta-
tion of witnesses and stipulate evidence in a prior conviction was held
essentially a question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support that
270. Id. at 671.
271. See Garcia v. State, 541 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
272. 534 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
273. 539 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
274. Hernandez v. State, 530 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
275. 530 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
276. McCoy v. State, 529 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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conviction, and thus not subject to collateral attack.277 An indictment giving
the wrong district court number in alleging a prior conviction will not be
fatally defective if the prior conviction was entered in a county with only one
district court; such a variance is material only if it prevents the defendant
from being able to find the record so that he can prepare to try any issues
concerning the prior conviction.
278
As to prior convictions in other states, if it can be shown that the defendant
was sentenced to and served time in the penitentiary, a prior felony convic-
tion will be held proved, as was done in Almand v. State.279 Two other minor
procedural points are covered in this case. First, where the penitentiary
packet proving a prior conviction for enhancement has been omitted from the
record on appeal, the court may properly order the packet made part of the
record before deciding the appeal. Second, although the trial court should
expressly find that the defendant has been convicted of a prior felony when
entering an enhanced sentence, a judgment which fails to do so may be
reformed on appeal if the record reflects that the prior conviction was proven.
A trial court's mistake was reformed in Phillips v. State,28° where, after the
jury had returned a minimum enhanced sentence of fifteen years, the judge
applied the indeterminate sentencing law in error, and entered a sentence of
"not less than five or more than 15 years." '281
A careless job of "proving-up" the prior conviction forced a remand for
rehearing on sentence in Bullard v. State.21 2 The state properly introduced
two sets of "jail card business records" in lieu of "penitentiary packets" to
prove-up two prior felony convictions. A deputy sheriff who specialized in
fingerprinting was called, and testified that the prints on one jail card matched
prints taken from the defendant that day, but he was not asked about the
prints on the second card. Although the court of criminal appeals found the
jail cards admissible evidence, it held that the proof was simply inadequate on
the prior convictions.
Federal enhancement statutes are not without their pitfalls, either. In fact,
the procedures prescribed in at least one type of case283 have been held to
require keeping the trial judge unaware of a notice of enhancement until after
conviction or guilty plea even though the notice must be filed with the court
clerk and served on the defendant. 28 Furthermore, the same federal statute
dictates a "ritual" for assessment of enhanced sentences which must be
277. Owens v. State, 540 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see notes 265-66 supra and
accompanying text.
278. Bray v. State, 531 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see notes 265-66 supra and
accompanying text. In Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), an indictment
alleging a prior conviction as "in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, in Cause No.
51926 . . .styled The State of Texas v. Plessinger" was also held to constitute harmless error
because the defendant did not show surprise, nor was he misled to his prejudice. Id. at 381.
279. 536 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
280. 538 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
281. Id. at 119. Under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c) (Vernon 1974), since the defendant
had two prior felony convictions, but no capital conviction, his minimum enhanced sentence was
fifteen years.
282. 533 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
283. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (Supp. 1976).
284. United States v. Bailey, 537 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Invited Argument. Every experienced defense lawyer knows the sickening
feeling of hearing counsel for the state make a damaging argument which
would have been subject to objection if not made in reply to an argument of
defense counsel. Recent cases are instructive as to the manner and extent of
such a reply, which are by no means without limitation. Even after the court's
in-depth analysis in Garrison v. State,2s6 a careful prosecutor may have
difficulty deciding how to respond, although he clearly is entitled' to do so.
Writing for the majority in Garrison, Judge Roberts found an emerging
pattern in cases concerning response to defense assertions that the defendant
had a clean record. The rule first enunciated in the 1921 case of Pounds v.
State287 is that the state may respond in its argument to defense contentions
that defendant has a good character. This is particularly true when the
argument by defense counsel is misleading, overbroad, outside the record, or
an incorrect statement of the law. In responding, however, the state "cannot
show specific misdeeds" which it could not otherwise have gotten into
evidence at all. Nor can the state exceed the bounds of defense cqunsel's
invitation. 28 In Garrison defense counsel made the misleading argument that
since the state had offered no evidence after defendant had proved his
eligibility for probation, that this meant that "if the State knew anything about
Joe Garrison that was bad, they would present it, and could have opened it
and told you exactly why he should not be granted probation .... ,,289 In
response the prosecuting attorney argued that defense counsel knew that the
state could not ask the defendant whether it was true that two or three months
earlier he had committed adultery many times, tried to molest young waitress-
es, and otherwise abused his wife. 2 The court said that the state could have
presented witnesses to attest to defendant's bad reputation, but "could not
have elicited all of the specific misdeeds of which they were aware except in
the form of 'Have you heard' questions directed at character witnesses for the
defendant, of which there were none. . . .The prosecutor thus exceeded the
limits of proper invited argument in recounting all of defendant's misdeeds
before the jury. '"29 1 The fair import of the prosecutor's argument was to
assert the misdeeds as facts, which the state could not have done even in a
"have you heard" question.3 However, the opinion fails to instruct the
prosecution as to how they should have responded, if not in the manner found
285. Id. United States v. Cevallos, 538 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1976). Parallel provisions of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 851 (1970), have
been found equally inflexible. See United States v. Garcia, 526 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1976).
286. 528 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
287. 89 Tex. 273, 230 S.W. 683 (1921).
288. 528 S.W.2d at 841.
289. Id. at 840.
290. Id. at 839.
291. Id. at 841-42.
292. Webber v. State, 472 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
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improper. In his dissent Judge Douglas argues that "from the tenor of the
majority opinion, the new rule about invited argument is that the prosecutor is
only invited to discuss what he has always had a right to argue-the evidence
in the case. "2 93
In related cases the court addressed itself to the manner in which the
prosecution may make its response when the defense argument raises the
subject of parole. A defense argument implying that the defendant could
remain in prison for as long as the jury decides is an invitation to the
prosecutor to respond. The response should be in kind, however, not through
a reading of the formula for parole eligibility.2" In Garrison the prosecutor's
argument was doubly objectionable, since he read the old statute which has
since been amended. Nevertheless, the opinion seems to indicate that even if
the reading of the statute had not been a misstatement of the law, such an
argument would have been improper, although apparently a general state-
ment by the prosecutor concerning parole eligibility would have been
acceptable.
Clanton v. State295 concerned an invitation to discuss parole as well, but it
was reversed because the state's argument was clearly an attempt to sidestep
the court's instructions. Reiterating the court's instructions to the jury not to
discuss among themselves how long the defendant would be required to serve
any sentence, the prosecutor then told the jury, "but you can, if you know
yourselves, base your decision, your verdict upon that."296 Moreover, he
argued, the admonition in the charge that parole was of "no concern" to the
jury bothered him because "it is a concern of yours .... ,,297 The state's
effort to portray these statements as invited argument was clearly an after-
thought, but the court's reply was instructive in regard to the manner and
extent of proper reply. The state's argument went much further than to
merely respond to remarks of defense counsel and was a direct attack upon
the court's instructions, and the court noted that "the State was entitled to
reply. . . by referring to the court's charge and by an explanatory statement
showing the inaccuracy of remarks of defense counsel. -298
To invite a damaging reply from the state which might otherwise have been
improper, the defense argument does not have to be improper itself. When it
is improper, however, it can have the effect of enlarging the perimeter within
which the state may reply. For instance, in Bailey v. State299 the court of
criminal appeals reversed a conviction because the prosecutor had argued
outside the record that an important witness was a prisoner in the penitentiary
and had refused to testify for the state. Defense counsel had asked rhetorical-
ly where the witness was and why he had not been called by the prosecution
previously, and further stated that the jury had a right to assume from his
absence that his testimony would not have been favorable to the state. On
293. 528 S.W.2d at 842.
294. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(c) (Vernon 1966).
295. 528 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
296. Id. at 252.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 255.
299. 531 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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appeal the state sought to justify its argument by citing a case apparently on
point, Meadowes v. State.300 In the opinion approved by the court, however,
Commissioner Dally found Meadowes distinguishable from Clanton because
the defense counsel in Meadowes had first gone outside the record, thus
permitting the prosecutor to respond by going outside the record. In the
instant case the defendant's argument was not objectionable and the perime-
ter of the state's response was accordingly smaller. A reply that the absent
witness was equally available to the defense and to the prosecution would
have been the appropriate response according to the court.
Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify. This rule is illustrated by two
recent cases, one resulting in an affirmance and the other in a reversal. In the
first case, Hargett v. State,30' the conviction was upheld despite defense
objection that the prosecutor's use of the phrase "undisputed evidence"
referred to the defendant's silence. 302 The court rejected this argument
because statements that the evidence is uncontroverted are not improper
where the record shows that a witness other than the defendant might have
offered contradictory evidence. The second case, Dubose v. State,303 in-
volved a robbery conviction in which the key witness testified that she had
been alone in the store with the defendant throughout the period of time which
was the subject of her testimony. Because there was no other witness to the
robbery the court of criminal appeals reversed the defendant's conviction,
finding that from the perspective of the jury, the prosecution argument based
on the testimony of this sole witness became even more clearly a comment on
the failure of the defendant to take the stand.
Actions can speak as loudly as words, as the following cases show. The
court of criminal appeals may be able to protect the defendant's constitutional
and statutory right to remain silent at trial, but unusual challenges to defense
counsel in preserving error for appellate review are presented in situations
where the prosecutor's "comment" is in sign language, which is not cus-
tomarily reflected in the court reporter's notes. In Bird v. State304 a capital
murder case involving a gun with a silencer, defense counsel took the stand to
make a bill of exception to the prosecutor's closing argument, in which the
prosecutor had made reference to the silencer and then "turned, leaned over
and looked directly at the appellant and stated, '. . . where did you get
it?' "35 At no time did the prosecution dispute or refute defense counsel. The
court did not qualify the informal bill of exception, but stated that it would
make no findings and would let the record speak for itself, and the record was
subsequently approved without objection. The conviction was reversed
because the court felt that the nature of the prosecutor's language and actions
constituted a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Judge Onion's
opinion in Bird summarizes the rule concerning failure to testify: "The test
300. 368 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
301. 534 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
302. Id. at 911.
303. 531 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
304. 527 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
305. Id. at 893.
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employed is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of
such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a
comment on the accused's failure to testify." 306 Before the language used in
reference to failure to testify can be held "harmless error," the court must
determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained,1 30 7 since the right to remain silent is a
federal constitutional right.
Hicks v. State318 presented the court with a more difficult problem because
the argument of the prosecutor was ambiguous in the context of the case
("but there is somebody that we haven't heard from in this case. And I think
you all know who it is.' ').31 Second, the defense counsel did not have himself
sworn in to testify for his bill of exception as did counsel in Bird. Instead, as
part of his objection to the argument, he stated that at the time the prosecuting
attorney was making his remarks, he stood right behind the defendant and
looked down at him.310 As in Bird, the court of criminal appeals noted that the
statement was undisputed by the prosecutor and unquestioned and unqual-
ified by the court. The record was approved and certified by the court
reporter. In this case, however, the prosecuting attorney had followed the
defense objection with his own explanation for the record: "[L]et the record
clearly reflect that I was talking about the medical testimony. .. ,"which, in
the context, meant he was not referring to the defendant's failure to testify. 31'
The conviction was reversed because, as Presiding Judge Onion explained,
the state had the right to comment on the accused's failure to call a certain
witness to support his defensive theory but it could not use such a statement
as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify, nor could the prosecutor
then excuse such a statement by claiming that he was referring to someone
else. Each judge filed a separate opinion, however, because of their disagree-
ment as to what rules govern disputes over the record.31 2
Regarding the defendant's right to remain silent, the Supreme Court held
that an accused's silence at the time of his arrest and the administration of the
Miranda warning cannot be used to impeach him at trial when he gives an
explanation which he failed to give at such time.31 3
VIII. EVIDENCE
Scientific Evidence and Business Records. In Roberts v. State314 the court of
criminal appeals reversed an order revoking probation after it was shown that
the evidence of morphine in the probationer's urine, which was the grounds
306. Id. at 894.
307. Id. at 895; see Chapman v. California, 336 U.S. 18 (1965).
308. 525 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
309. Id. at 178.
310. Id. at 182.
311. Id. at 178.
312. Judges Morrison and Douglas dissented. Judge Douglas filed a lengthy, thorough opinion
complaining that the majority had "elevated an unsworn statement of counsel to the heights of
evidence," contrary to precedent in the area. Id. at 182.
313. Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976).
314. 537 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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for revocation, was hearsay. The laboratory supervisor of the Travis County
probation office, whose own emit spectrophotometer analysis was shown to
be inconclusive, took the urine sample to Houston where he observed another
person analyze it on a spectrofloremeter, a machine he could not operate. He
admitted he had no expertise on the machine and he relied on the other's
explanation. Holding the testimony to be inadmissible hearsay, the court said:
It is not the mere fact that Gleason did not personally operate the
machine that rendered his testimony inadmissible. Rather, his lack of
expertise with respect to the machine and his reliance upon the assumed
expertise of others deprived appellant of any meaningful cross-
examination upon the accuracy of the machine. 31'
Another kind of modern technology was the basis for reversal of Gassett v.
State,3 16 an opinion which provides an initial determination of the status of
National Criminal Information Center (N.C.I.C.) computer records in Texas
criminal trials. In a Dallas murder trial the decedent's prior criminal record
came into issue when his ex-wife testified about his indictments and arrests.
The state called a district attorney office investigator who testified that the
N.C.I.C. computer revealed no record of arrests or indictments concerning
the deceased. In this case of first impression the court of criminal appeals
reversed by a three-to-two margin, concluding that the state had failed to
satisfy the requisites of article 3737e30 17 governing the applicable business
records exception to the hearsay rule. The witness was not the person who
entered the information, custodian of the records, or otherwise qualified to
give the testimony as required by section 2.318 Judges Morrison and Douglas,
both of whom filed dissenting opinions, considered the error harmless
because the decedent's criminal record had been raised by incompetent
evidence in the first place.
315. Id. at 463.
316. 532 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
317. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides:
Section 1. A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall, insofar
as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or event or the
existence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or representative of
such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or condition to make
such memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be included in
such memorandum or record;
(c) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reasonably
soon thereafter ...
Section 3. Evidence to the effect that the records of a business do not contain
any memorandum or record of an alleged act, event or condition shall be
competent to prove the non-occurrence of the act or event or the non-existence of
the condition in that business if the judge finds that it was the regular course of
that business to make such memoranda or records of all such acts, events or
conditions at the time or within reasonable time thereafter and to preserve them.
318. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides:
Section 2. The identity and mode of preparation of the memorandum or record
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph one (i) may be proved by the
testimony of the entrant, custodian or other qualified witness even though he may
not have personal knowledge as to the various items or contents of such
memorandum or record. Such lack of personal knowledge may be shown to affect
the weight and credibility of the memorandum or record but shall not affect its
admissibility.
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Where will the other shoe fall? Unanswered is the admissibility of N.C.I.C.
records per se. Would the case have been affirmed if the prosecution had
called the sheriff's office employee who operates the N.C.I.C. computer
terminal, or if the state had proved that the investigator knew enough of the
N.C.I.C. computer record system to be a qualified witness himself under
article 3737e, section 2.319 The court remarked on the absence of such
additional proof,320 yet the majority opinion by Judge Roberts notably casts
doubt on the probative value of N.C.I.C. computer records generally. 321
Extraneous Offenses. Halliburton v. State322 and Cameron v. State323 are
recent battles in the war over admission of extraneous offenses under an
exception to the general rule excluding such prejudicial evidence. 324 Hallibur-
ton affirmed a murder conviction where self-defense had been raised. The
defendant testified that she had no intent to kill the decedent, her common-
law husband. The majority thought proper the admission into evidence of
testimony concerning a shooting incident which occurred five weeks after the
murder, in which the defendant had accosted a man who owed her money and
had wounded him with a pistol when he said he had no money. The majority
cited Lolmaugh v. State,325 the trial of a husband for shooting his wife's lover.
In that case evidence that the defendant had shot another of his wife's lovers
was permitted for the purpose of attacking his assertion he was motivated
only by self-defense. In his dissent in Halliburton, however, Judge Roberts
says the rule stated in Lolmaugh is aimed at violence towards members of a
class of persons, such as a wife's lovers, and the two shooting victims in the
Halliburton case, he argued, were not of the same class. 326 In his second
dissent on motion for rehearing he added his concern that the majority's
decision creates a rule which forces an accused to an unconstitutional choice
between testifying to a defense and having a trial free of evidence that he
possesses general criminal tendencies. 327
In Cameron, which was reversed, the extraneous offense was offered to
prove identity in a robbery case in which the defense was an alibi. There was
no question that identity was an issue. The case turned on the similarity
between the offense on trial and the extraneous offense offered to prove
identity. The court found too many disparate characteristics to agree with the
trial court's admission of evidence of one offense to show commission of the
other. The similarities included black males in both offenses, pistols, and
instructions to the clerk to put the money in a bag, while the dissimilarities
included disguise, number of robbers, type of business establishment robbed,
319. Id.
320. 532 S.W.2d at 331.
321. Id. See, e.g., Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), for the court's
similar view toward the admissibility of polygraph examinations.
322. 528 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
323. 530 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Both Halliburton and Cameron were decided by
3-2 votes, and dissents were filed in each.
324. See, e.g., Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
325. 514 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
326. 528 S.W.2d at 218.
327. Id. at 220.
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mode of approaching the cashier, and sending the cashier to lie down in the
back room.32 Judge Douglas, the author of the majority opinion affirming
Halliburton, wrote a dissenting opinion in Cameron joined by Presiding
Judge Onion. He argued that the decision was retrogressive because it
disregarded the 1974 case of Ransom v. State329 in which the court opinion
diminished the importance of similarities and dissimilarities.
Cross-Examination of Reputation Witness. During cross examination of
defense reputation witnesses in a criminal trial, it is not reversible error for
the prosecuting attorney to bring to the jury's attention other accusations
against the defendant so long as the prosecutor does so by the oblique ritual of
asking whether the witness "has heard" of the other offense. 30 On rehearing
in Carey v. State,331 the court of criminal appeals restated the prohibition
against departing from the prescribed language but clarified the law concern-
ing whether such an infraction may be mere harmless error. In the case before
the court the state's attorney asked the witness "was there an incident
sometime in August of 1974, wherein a pistol was exhibited?' 332 This question
was found to be improper because it implied the commission of another
offense; nevertheless, the court affirmed the lower court decision. After
praising the trial judge for his thorough and earnest instruction to the jury to
disregard the question,3 33 the court reviewed the case and found no harm was
done because the instruction was sufficient to cure the error. The opinion
explicitly overrules 334 language in Parasco v. State335 which said such error
could not be harmless: "Whenever a question is asked which amounts to an
assertion of fact and implies the commission of another offense, its harmful-
ness cannot be cured by the answer or failure to answer, or by any instruction
which the court may give, and reversible error is reflected thereby. 336 The
concurring judges, Roberts and Odom, joined in the decision to overrule the
broad language in Parasco but stressed that the court's decision fell within a
very limited exception, properly set forth by language in McNaulty v. State337
as follows:
Some [questions] may be harmless and some may be made harmless by a
negative answer, but whenever the question is so stated that it amounts to
an assertion of fact under the conditions here under discussion and it
implies the commission of another offense, it may be said that its
harmfulness cannot be cured by the answer and seldom by an instruction
which the court is able to give to the jury. 38
328. Judge Douglas enumerates the similarities in his dissent, 530 S.W.2d at 845; the latter
three dissimilarities listed in the text were not singled out for comment by the majority or
dissenting opinions.
329. 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
330. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
331. 537 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
332. Id. at 758.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 759.
335. 168 Tex. Crim. 89, 323 S.W.2d 257 (1959).
336. Id. at 91, 323 S.W.2d at 259.
337. 138 Tex. Crim. 317, 135 S.W.2d 987 (1940).
338. Id. at 320, 136 S.W.2d at 988-89.
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The same objection was raised in Odum v. State339 when the state's
attorney cross-examined the defendant's wife as follows: "Isn't it true that
you were with your husband back on December the 1st, 1972, out here at
McDonald's at Fillmore and Northeast Eighth when he tried to cut a kid's
throat?""34 The court of criminal appeals rejected the argument that the
question was proper because the witness' testimony made her a reputation
witness 34' and reversed the conviction on the grounds that "the State may not
ask whether the witness has personal knowledge of the act, nor may its
questions be so framed as to imply that the act has actually been
committed. "342
339. 533 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
340. Id. at 2.
341. During the guilt-innocence trial the defendant's wife testified on direct examination that
under "normal" circumstances her husband "would kid around" and was "pretty good na-
tured," but on the occasion of the crime charged he acted scared and turned white. Id. In its
opinion the court of criminal appeals said this "testimony was not geared toward a showing of
good, lawful character or reputation, but was directed at proof of appellant's conduct and
appearance at a particular time." Id. at 4.
342. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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